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Abstract
This paper analyses the consequences of an unusual type of land redistribution; we take land
from the very rich, as usual, but give it to the rich instead of the poor. We show that such “moder-
ate” reform reduces agency costs and thereby increases productivity, total surplus in the economy,
and the welfare of rural workers. Compared to the classic redistribution ”to the tiller”, moderate
reforms do worse in terms of equity and do not give the poor a collaterizable asset. They can
however do equally well in terms of efﬁciency and might be more sustainable both ﬁnancially and
politically.
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Land redistribution from large owners to landless peasants has long been key
in the agenda of policy makers in developing countries. Besides reducing in-
equality andsocial unrest, the general consensus is that redistributing land“to
the tiller” lowers agency costs and increases agricultural productivity. How-
ever, while in the last …fty years most countries have attempted redistributive
reforms, very few have been successful and it is unclear whether the equity
and e¢ciency gains are large enough to cover the political and economic costs
(see, for instance, Banerjee 1999). Unless they are generously compensated,
landowners can stage strong political resistance which makes redistribution
“to the tiller” either too expensive or politically unsustainable. In addition,
due to the lack of credit or complementary inputs the e¤ects of such reforms
are often short-lived as the poorest bene…ciaries are forced to sell back (see,
for instance, Binswanger et al 1995).
This paper analyzes an alternative and more “moderate” type of reform;
we focus on land transfers that increase equality only within the class of large
landowners. The issue has practical relevance because land concentration
among the wealthiest exhibits strong variation across countries, even among
those with a similar degree of inequality overall. For instance, the Gini coef-
…cient on landholdings in Brazil and Colombia is very similar (84.1 and 82.9
respectively) but land concentration among the wealthiest is quite di¤erent.
In Brazil, seventy percent of cultivated land belongs to the largest …ve percent
of landowners while in Colombia the percentage rises to sixteen percent. Dif-
ferences across continents are more striking. In India and Korea, for instance,
seventy percent of the land belongs to the top twenty-four and forty percent
of landowners, respectively.1
Thispapermakesonesimplepoint: “moderate”reforms canreduce agency
costs and increase agricultural productivity, even if the number of landless
workers subject to moral hazard does not decrease. The key intuition is that
the distribution of landholdings among large owners determines the degree of
competition in the market for rural laborers and consequently the bargaining
power of the landowners vs. the workers. This, in turn, a¤ects incentives and
productivity.
We develop a simple model in which landowners hire workers to cultivate
their land. We assume that output depends on workers’ e¤ort, which cannot
be observed by the landowners, and that workers are subject to limited liabil-
ity. Each landowner chooses the number of workers she hires and the contract
she o¤ers them, taking as given the other landowners’ actions. In this con-
1World Census of Agriculture 2000, FAO.
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productivity and welfare.
Our main result is that starting from a relatively unequal landownership,
an equalizing redistribution among landowners increases productivity and to-
tal surplus. The intuition is as follows. Limited liability imposes an upper
bound on the punishment that can be borne by the worker, implying that in-
centives must be provided by o¤ering rewards. This makes incentive provision
costly and therefore makes landowners o¤er low-powered incentives. Reducing
land concentration may mitigate this e¤ect as landlords compete more …ercely
in the labor market and hence o¤er higher compensation to workers in equi-
librium. Higher compensation translates into higher rewards for success and
hence stronger incentives.
Agency issues give a new twist to the familiar relation between concen-
tration, competition and e¢ciency: the …ercer competition that follows an
equalizing redistribution increases not only employment but also the produc-
tivity of each worker. In particular, we show that, for some parameter values,
a moderate reform may yield the …rst best level of e¤ort.
Finally, our welfare analysis reveals that moderate land reforms increase
the welfare of peasants as well as the welfare of the landowner on the receiving
end while the joint welfare of landowners decreases. This has the important
implicationthat although such redistribution increases e¢ciency, it will not be
executedby the market. Thus, a productivity-enhancing equalizing redistribu-
tion canbe implemented only by the redistribution of land; such redistribution
canbe a result of land ceilings or of an outright con…scation and redistribution.
The results rely on the existence of moral hazard, which, in agriculture,
can hardly be disputed. By its own nature, agricultural work requires e¤ort
thatis hard tomonitor and whose e¤ect on outcomes cannot beseparatedfrom
other exogenous factors. Empirical evidence suggests that farmers achieve
higher yields andchoose di¤erent techniques on the plots they own rather than
on the ones they rent (Shaban 1987, Bandiera 2003). In addition, productivity
per unit of land is higher in small family farms than in large farms relying on
hiredlabor whoaresubject to moral hazard (Berry andCline1979, Binswanger
et al 1995, Rosenzweig and Binswanger 1993).
The available evidence also provides support for our main result, by show-
ing that inequality within the landowning class matters over and above the
e¤ect of inequality between classes. First, the productivity di¤erential be-
tween small and large farms is largest where the di¤erence in size is largest, as
in Latin America where a few landlords own very large holdings (Berry and
Cline, 1979). Second, existing estimates of agency costs, which are based on
Asian data, are far too small to account for the productivity di¤erentials in
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that due to the lack of competition among landlords, agency problems might
be more serious when most of the land belongs to (very) few.
This paper contributes to the large theoretical literature on the e¤ects of
redistributive land reforms and in particular to the literature on bargaining
power in agrarian relations under moral hazard. The theoretical link between
theine¢ciency derivingfrom limitedliabilityandtherelativebargaining power
of the two parties has been analyzed, for instance, by Banerjee et al (2002),
Dutta et al (1989) and Mookherjee (1997). These papers show that an in-
crease in the agent’s bargaining power, or equivalently in his reservation util-
ity, reduces ine¢ciency and increases productivity.2 Our paper contributes to
this literature by identifying and formalizing a mechanism that endogenously
determines the allocation of bargaining power between classes, namely, the
distribution of land within large landowners.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section
presents the model. In Section 3 we analyze the e¤ects of redistribution on
productivity and welfare. In section 4, we use our results to shed some light
on an interesting policy question, that is, the comparison between a full scale
redistribution (redistribution to the tiller) and a moderate redistribution be-
tween landowners. Both increase the productivity of workers and employment
levels but moderate reforms may be more economically and politically sus-
tainable compared to redistribution from landowners to landless peasants. We
conclude in section 5 and the appendix contains all proofs.
2 The Model
2.1 Set-up
Landowners and workers meet in the labor market where landowners hire
workers to cultivate their land. Cultivation is subject to moral hazard since
the worker’s e¤ort, which a¤ects output, is neither observable nor veri…able.
Landowners compete in the labor market a la Cournot; each landowner hires
workers to maximize pro…ts, given the labor demand of the other landowners.
The equilibrium in the labor market determines the workers’ compensation.
Given this, landowners optimally choose the terms of the contract they o¤er
2Banerjee et al (2002) also present empirical evidence suggesting that, in West Bengal,
the introduction of laws that exogenously increase the bargaining power of tenants vs.
landowners generally leads to an increase in productivity. Using data from the 16 main
Indian states, Besley and Burgess (2000) show that similar tenancy laws have decreased
poverty but also output.
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and workers’ productivity and analyze how these change as a function of the
distribution of land among landowners.3
We analyze a one period game, or equivalently, a situation in which
landowners and workers match only once.4 For simplicity of exposition, we
assume that there are only two landowners and that landowners and work-
ers are risk neutral.5 We also assume that landowners are price takers in the
market for agricultural produce.6 Finally, we assume that when landowners
employ workers, they make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er. This assumption is not
important and our results go through as long as the landowners have some
bargaining power.
The labor market.
Labor supply. We assume that di¤erent workers have di¤erent values of
reservation utility v; according to a continuous density function f(v): Labor
supply is then de…ned as F(v); the cumulative distribution of v: For future
purposes, denote the inverse labor supply function by v(L) = F ¡1(L). We
focus on distributions of v that yield a concave labor supply schedule.7 Our
analysis does not rely on this assumption but it simpli…es matters (see the
appendix).
Labor demand. Each landowner i, i 2 f1;2g; chooses how many workers
Li to hire. All workers are equally good at cultivation. We de…ne one plot as
the unit of land that can be cultivated by one worker. We denote by N the
total number of plots in the economy and by N1 the number of plots owned
by landowner 1:
Landowners, obviously, can hire as many workers as they wish and need
not employ all of them as cultivators. It is however trivial to show that
landowners strictly prefer not to pay for workers who do not produce any-
thing. Thus, landowners e¤ectively act as if they are subject to a “capacity
constraint”, that is, the number of workers they hire cannot be larger than the
3The assumption that landowners compete a la Cournot is not critical. Similar results
obtain if one assumes that landowners compete in a Bertrand fashion and that workers are
heterogenous for instance because they face di¤erent travel costs to the farms.
4We discuss later on the consequences of relaxing this assumption.
5In Bandiera and Levy (2004) we relax these assumptions and illustrate the robustness
of our results for the cases of many landlords and risk averse agents.
6Relaxing this assumption opens a third channel through which redistribution among
landowners increases production. We prefer not to take this into account to highlight the
e¤ect of redistribution on agency costs. Assuming that landlords have market power in the
product market leaves the basic conclusions unchanged.
7For example the exponential density yields F (v) =(1¡ e¡v=„) where „ is the mean and
Fv > 0; Fvv < 0:
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Without loss of generality we analyze the case of N1 · N
2 and refer to
landowner 1 as the “small owner” and to landowner 2 as the “large owner”.
N1 and N characterize the distribution of land holdings among owners. Specif-
ically, the smaller is N1; the more unequal is the distribution of land holding.
Denote by ¦1(:) landowner 1’s expected pro…ts. These are maximized
subject to the capacity constraint (the …rst constraint, below) and the labor
market clearing condition(the second constraint, below).8 The maximization






L1 + L2 = F(v);
where landowner 2’s maximization problem is de…ned analogously. Equi-
librium values of the employment level and of pay in utility terms are denoted
by ¹ L and ¹ v respectively.
We next provide the details of the production technology and of the con-
tracts that landowners o¤er to their workers. These determine thepreciseform
of the pro…t function ¦i(L1;L2) for landowner i.
Production technology.
Productiononeachplotisstochastic anddepends onworkers’non-observable
e¤ort. Production can either succeed, in which case the value of output is 1 (a
‘good’ state); or fail, in which case the value of output is 0 (a ‘bad’ state): The
probability of success depends on the e¤ort e according to a function p(e); for
p(e) 2 (0;1); p0(e) > 0; p00(e) · 0: E¤ort entails disutility d(e) for the worker,
where d0(e) > 0 and d00(e) ¸ 0: It will also be convenient to assume p000(e) · 0
and d000(e) ¸ 0; although it is not necessary for our results (see the appendix).
De…ne S(e) as the expected total surplus from cultivation. This is equal
to the expected value of production minus the disutility of e¤ort, that is,
p(e)¡ d(e): To guarantee an interior solution, we assume that p(e)¡ d(e) > 0
for any e; namely cultivation is pro…table for any e.
Contracts and constraints.
8We assume throughout that the labor market clears, i.e. that there is no involuntary
unemployment. This is without loss of generality in a one-period framework but might make
a di¤erence if the time horizon is longer. In this case, e¢ciency wages or eviction threats
could be used as an incentive mechanism. See the discussion in Bandiera and Levy (2004).
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e¤ort and e¤ort entails disutility, contracts must be designed to provide incen-
tives. In this setting incentives can be provided by giving the worker a stake,
that is, by conditioning his pay on the observed outcome. A contract is then
de…ned by the pair (g;b) where g is the pay in the good state and b is the
pay in the bad state. We assume that landowners cannot discriminate among
workers, and hence they must o¤er the same contract (g;b) to all.9
The contract must satisfy three constraints. First, it must provide each
worker with ¹ v; the equilibrium compensation determined in the labor market:
This is the equivalent of the participation constraint in the standard principal-
agentproblem. There aretwodi¤erencescomparedwith the standardproblem;
…rst, ¹ v is endogenously determined in our model and second, since landowners
cannot observe the individual worker’s true reservation utility v, all workers
must be guaranteed the same utility ¹ v:
The second constraint is the incentive compatibility constraint. That is,
the landowner has to take into account that the worker will choose an e¤ort
level e to maximize his utility, given the contract (g;b): Note that since all
farmers receive the same contract, (g;b); they all exert the same e¤ort level e:
Finally, we assume that workers are subject to limited liability. The terms
of the contract must be such that in each state of nature the worker is left
with enough resources to survive. We assume that all workers possess the
same initial wealth w and, without loss of generality, set the subsistence level
of consumption at 0:
Given the above, pro…ts per plot are the same for all workers, and hence
landowners set (g;b) to maximize pro…ts per plot. Both landowners face the
same contractual environment and therefore o¤er the same contract in equilib-
rium. In particular, maximizing pro…ts per plot yields the following problem:
max
g;b




0)g+ (1 ¡ p(e
0))b¡ d(e
0)g (IC)
p(e)g + (1¡ p(e))b¡ d(e) = ¹ v (PC)
b ¸ ¡w (LL)
9Note that g ¡ b = 0 is equivalent to a …xed wage; g ¡ b = sp(e) with s < 1 is equivalent
to a sharecropping contract where s is the worker’s share and g ¡ b = p(e) with b < 0 is
equivalent to a …xed rent contract.
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Timing.
Given the above, we can summarize the pro…t per plot function for any
landowner by …(w;¹ v). The compensation ¹ v is determined in the …rst stage and
depends on the level of labor demand, L1 and L2. Thus, the pro…t function
that each landowner i perceives at the …rst stage, ¦i(L1;L2); is equal to pro…ts
per plot multiplied by the number of employed workers, and can be expressed
as:
¦i(L1;L2) = Li…(w;v(Li +Lj)):
The timing of the game is as follows. In the …rst stage each landowner
chooses howmany workers to hire Li subject to a capacity constraint, Ni ¸ Li:
From market clearance, equilibrium pay in utility terms ¹ v is determined as
¹ v = F¡1(¹ L1+¹ L2) where ¹ Li is the equilibriumlevel of employment oflandowner
i;i = 1;2.
In the second and …nal stage each landowner o¤ers her workers a contract
(g;b) subject tothe incentive compatibility, the limitedliability andthe partic-
ipationconstraints. The relevant level of reservationutility intheparticipation
constraint is ¹ v; as determined in the …rst stage.
2.2 Equilibrium analysis
We analyze the game by backward induction and solve …rst for the optimal
contract, namely, the contract that maximizes the pro…ts per plot for each
landowner in the second stage of the game.
2.2.1 The Optimal Contract
To solve for the optimal contract, we follow a similar analysis as the one
in Banerjee et al (2002), Dutta et al (1989) and Mookherjee (1997). The
solution, as we show in the appendix, depends on the wealth of the workers,
w: In particular there is a wealth threshold, ¹ w(¹ v) such that:
(i) when w ¸ ¹ w(¹ v) the limited liability constraint does not bind and the
optimal contract yields the …rst best level of e¤ort, that is the level of e¤ort
that maximizes total surplus;
(ii) when w < ¹ w(¹ v); the limited liability constraint binds and the equilib-
rium level of e¤ort is lower than …rst best.
The intuition behind this result is as follows: incentives are provided by
creating a spread between the payment in the good and in the bad state,
which can be done either by rewarding the worker in the good state or by
7 Bandiera and Levy: The Economics of  Moderate Land Reforms
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on the punishment that can be in‡icted in the bad state and makes incentive
provision costly. This, in turn, results in a level of e¤ort which is lower than
…rst best.
The terms ofthe contract, as well as the induced e¤ort level, may therefore
depend on ¹ v; the compensation which must be guaranteed to all workers. As
we now show, for some values of wealth, an increase in ¹ v increases the e¤ort
level exerted in equilibrium:
Lemma 1 (i) When workers are poor, namely, w < ¹ w(¹ v); the optimal
contract elicits e¤ort which is strictly increasing in ¹ v. (ii) The threshold ¹ w(¹ v)
decreases in ¹ v implying that a large enough increase in ¹ v results in the …rst
best level of e¤ort.
The intuition behind the Lemma is as follows. A higher value of ¹ v im-
plies that the landowner has to provide the worker with a higher utility. The
landowner can achieve this by either increasing g; the payment in the good
state, by increasing b; the payment in the bad state, or by increasing both.
Increasing b alone however, is not optimal. Increasing the reward in the bad
state reduces the spread between the good and the bad state thus resulting
in lower incentives to exert e¤ort. The landowner would end up paying more
for less as workers would receive higher compensation but exert lower e¤ort.
Similarly, increasing both g and b to keep the spread constant cannot be op-
timal as the workers would receive higher compensation but exert the same
level of e¤ort. The optimal way for the landowner to increase the utility of the
worker from the contract is by increasing only the payment in the good state.
This, in turn, provides more powerful incentives to exert e¤ort. Clearly, then,
a large enough increase in ¹ v can decrease the threshold to the point that …rst
best e¤ort level is induced.
The lemma illustrates therefore that when workers are poor so that the
limited liability constraint binds, the value of ¹ v plays a role in determining
e¤ort and surplus. The value of ¹ v is determined endogenously in our model,
and results from the interaction of labor demand and supply, to be analyzed
next.
2.2.2 Equilibrium employment
When landowners choose how many workers to hire, they take into account
that their pro…t per plot is a function of the compensation ¹ v, which in turn
is a function of the total employment level in equilibrium. This is summa-
rized by the function …(w;v(L)): Landowner i therefore chooses Li in order to
maximize:




given Lj and subject to the capacity constraint:
Li · Ni:
Hiring one extra worker a¤ects pro…ts in three ways. First, the landowner
gains from one more plot being cultivated. Second, as she hires one more
worker each inframarginal worker has to be paid more. Third, as shown in
Lemma1, higher pay results ina higher e¤ortlevel forall inframarginal workers
and hence higher expected pro…ts on all inframarginal plots. The …rst two
e¤ects capture the standard trade-o¤ deriving from market power. The third
arises from the combination of moral hazard andlimited liability and is unique
to this setting.
Recall that we refer to landowner 1 as the “small” owner as N1 ·
N
2 .
We next show that the equilibrium employment level is a function of the land
distribution, characterized by the number of plots held by the small owner,
N1:
Lemma 2 For each distribution of land there is a unique equilibrium;
(i) When N is su¢ciently large and land distribution su¢ciently equal,
both landowners employ the same number of workers in equilibrium:
(ii) When N issu¢cientlylarge and the land distribution issu¢cientlyun-
equal, then the small owner employs N1 workers, and the large owner employs
L2(N1) workers, where L2(N1) > N1: Labor demands are strategic substitutes.
(iii) When N is small, landlord i employs Ni and total employment is N,
regardless of the distribution of land.
When the total land endowment is small, the capacity constraint binds for
both landowners and the total employment level is N; regardless of the degree
of inequality. When the total land endowment is su¢ciently large, there are
two types of equilibria, depending on the degree of inequality. First, if in-
equality is high the small owner’s capacity constraint binds. She then employs
N1 workers; and the large owner employs the best response employment given
N1; L2(N1): Second, if the distribution is su¢ciently equal neither constraint
binds. The equilibrium level is as in a standard Cournot game, namely, it is a
symmetric level of employment which does not depend on N1: We denote the
critical level of N1; namely, the level beyond which the equilibrium is symmet-
ric and the capacity constraint does not bind for the small owner, as ~ N1(N);
or simply ~ N1: We therefore say that the distribution of land is su¢ciently un-
equal (equal) if N1 < (¸) ~ N1: Note that since we maintain the convention that
landowner 1 is the small owner, then ~ N1 · N
2:
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librium level of pay in utility terms ¹ v and, as a result, the level of e¤ort ¹ e in
the second stage. We are now ready to analyze the e¤ect of redistribution on
total surplus in the economy.
3 The e¤ect of redistribution
The purpose of this section is to analyze the consequences of an equalizing
redistribution, namely, a land transfer from the large to the small owner, on
employment, productivity, total surplus and the welfare of all parties involved.
From Lemma 2 we know that when the total land endowment is small,
employment is set at N and does not depend on the distribution of landhold-
ings. Thus, equilibrium values of employment, ¹ L; pay in utility terms ¹ v, and
consequently the terms of the contract ¹ e; ¹ g and ¹ b, cannot be a¤ected by redis-
tribution. In what follows we focus on the more interesting case in which N
is large enough.
3.1 Redistribution, productivity and total surplus
Let TS denote total surplus in equilibrium, de…ned as the surplus generated
by each worker multiplied by the number of employed workers. Recall that
the surplus generated by each worker is S(e):10 Thus, TS = ¹ L ¢ S(¹ e): We
now analyze the impact of redistribution on total surplus, via equilibrium
employment and workers’ e¤ort. The next lemma characterizes the e¤ect of
redistribution on total employment ¹ L:
Lemma 3 Starting from an unequal distribution of land, an equalizing
redistribution increases total employment.
When the distribution of land is su¢ciently unequal, the capacity con-
straint binds for the small owner. Redistribution leads then to an increase in
the number of workers she hires. The large landowner, as a response, decreases
her demand for workers as labor demands are strategic substitutes. But the
large landowner does not internalize the full e¤ect of labor demand, imply-
ing that total labor demand increases. As a result, the equilibrium level of
employment increases following redistribution.
A large enough redistribution can even increase N1 beyond the threshold
~ N1, inwhichcase neither capacity constraintbinds. Thisinducesthemaximum
level of employment for this economy: On the other hand, if the initial land
10Total surplus is equal to p(e) ¡ d(e):
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either landowner. In this case, redistribution has no e¤ect on employment.
To clear the labor market, higher level of employment results in higher
compensation for the workers, that is, higher ¹ v: Lemma 1 shows that higher
compensationleads to higher e¤ort whenfarmers arepoor. Combining Lemma
1 and Lemma 3 we can then state:
Proposition 1 Starting from a su¢ciently unequal distribution of land,
an equalizing redistribution among landowners results in higher employment
and, when workers are poor, also higher e¤ort and productivityfor each worker.
Total surplus increases as a consequence and reaches its maximum when the
distribution of land becomes su¢ciently equal.
Redistribution leads to more competition in the labor market. The large
landowner loses market power and this, as in standard models, induces higher
employment and higher pay for workers in equilibrium. Moral hazard and
limited liability add a new twist: when workers are poor, so that the limited
liability constraint binds, higher compensation results also in stronger incen-
tives and hence higher e¤ort exerted by all workers. We therefore detect an
e¢ciency enhancing e¤ect of redistribution, which is over and above the stan-
dard e¤ect on the marginal worker. As in the standard model, the marginal
worker becomes employed and hence total surplus increases. In addition, in
our model, inframarginal workers also work harder and produce more if they
are su¢ciently poor.11
For some parameters values, equilibrium e¤ort might reach its …rst best
level after redistribution, as speci…ed in corollary 1:
Corollary 1 If the e¤ort level is at …rst best when the land distribution
is relatively equal, then starting from an unequal land distribution, there exists
an ^ N1 · ~ N1; such that an equalizing redistribution which leads to N1 ¸ ^ N1;
induces the …rst best e¤ort level for all employed workers.
It is important to note that our results are robust to several other speci…-
cations of the model, such as increasing the number of landowners or allowing
for risk averse workers. Finally, in a multi-period setting incentives can also
be provided via eviction threats (Dutta et al 1989, Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984).
Since eviction threats are most e¤ective at eliciting e¤ort when there is a low
probability of …nding a new job, equalizing redistributions that increase em-
ployment may weaken the role of eviction threats as an incentive mechanism.
11In addition to their e¤ect on moral hazard, higher wages might also increase workers’
productivity as they are able to improve their nutrition status (see for example Dasgupta
and Ray (1986, 1987) and Moene (1992)). This e¤ect, if present, would reinforce our main
result.
11 Bandiera and Levy: The Economics of  Moderate Land Reforms
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3.2 Redistribution and welfare
We now consider how the welfare of landowners and workers changes as a
result of an equalizing redistribution:
Proposition 2 Starting from a su¢ciently unequal distribution of land,
an equalizing redistribution among landowners leads to:
(i) an increase in the welfare of each inframarginal worker;
(ii) an increase in the pro…ts of the small landowner;
(iii) a decrease in the pro…ts of the large landowner and in the joint pro…ts
of both landowners.
The intuition for (i) is straightforward: redistribution increases workers’
compensation net of disutility costs, implying that all inframarginal workers
are better o¤. As for (ii) and (iii), note that redistribution a¤ects landown-
ers’ welfare in three ways. First, their welfare increases because total surplus
from each plot increases as each worker puts in more e¤ort. Second, welfare
decreases because they have to reward their workers with a higher compen-
sation. Third, the number of cultivated plots increases for the small owner
and decreases for the large owner. This increases welfare for the former and
decreases it for the latter.
Overall the welfare of the small owner must increase. This is a feature of
both labor demands being strategic substitutes and of her capacity constraint
being initially binding. These imply that the small landowner hires more
workers while at the same time the large landowner hires less, which results
in an increase of the small owner’s pro…ts. In fact, the small owner’s pro…ts
are highest when the land distribution becomes relatively equal.
The joint welfare of landowners is maximized at N1 = 0; that is, when
one landowner acts as a monopolist and internalizes all externalities. It then
follows that as N1 increases their joint welfare falls. Since the welfare of the
small landowner increases, that of the large owner must decrease.
Importantly, the welfare analysis implies that although redistribution in-
creases e¢ciency, it will not be executed by the market. The joint welfare of
the landowners decreases and hence they cannot agree on any price for land
transaction.12 The welfare analysis also sheds some light on the political sus-
tainability of moderate reforms, as we discuss in the section below.
12This is similar to the standard monopoly/duopoly theory in which the market forces
push towards a cartel. Our result simply maintains that this holds in the presence of
asymmetric information as well.
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pared to redistribution across classes
We have shown that a moderate redistribution of land within the landowning
class can enhance e¢ciency, increasing both employment and productivity in
therural sector. An interesting policy question is howmoderate redistributions
compare to full scale redistributions tothe tiller, in terms of bene…ts and costs.
While a formal comparison is beyond the scope of the paper, we can still use
the insights gained by our model to shed some light on this question.
Both reforms can be bene…cial in terms of the productivity of each worker
as well as the total employment in the economy. Moderate reforms increase
productivity and as corollary 1 shows, may induce the …rst best level of e¤ort
when tenants are not too poor. Redistribution of land from landowners to
workers has similar e¤ects. It increases the incentives to exert e¤ort by making
the worker the residual claimant. However, if workers are too poor, agency
problems still exist to the extent that the new owner needs to borrow to
…nance cultivation (Mookherjee 1997). In the presence of liquidity constraints
and moral hazard problems for workers-borrowers, …rst best e¤ort levels are
not necessarily achieved even if land is redistributed to the tiller.
In terms of employment, as long as landowners retain some market power,
a moderate land redistribution would result in a lower employment level com-
pared with redistribution to the tiller. Both types of redistribution would
increase employment, but after a full scale redistribution, all plots are culti-
vated whereas powerful landowners tend to employ ine¢ciently low numbers
of workers. However, since total surplus is a combination of both employment
and productivity, given the above discussion about productivity and e¤ort lev-
els, there is no clear cut comparison between the two reforms in terms of their
bene…ts.
Redistributing land entails both …nancial and political costs. The wel-
fare analysis suggests that, compared to a full scale redistribution, moderate
reforms could be more politically viable. A full scale redistribution increases
workers’ welfare at the expense of all landowners’ and is therefore likely to be
opposed by the landowning class as a whole. This, combined with the fact
that landowners have a comparative advantage at lobbying if not overwhelm-
ing political power,13 implies that full scale redistributions are unlikely to be
13Baland and Robinson (2003) present evidence indicating that large landowners have
control over their workers’ votes, especially in areas with large land inequality. Landowners’
control seems to have diminished after the introduction of the secret ballot but remains
endemic throughout the developing world.
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have succeeded in peacetime (Binswanger et al 1995, Bell 1990). On the other
hand, reforms which redistribute land within the landowning class, break its
cohesion and might be politically easier to implement.
Moderate land redistributions are also likely to be more sustainable …-
nancially. Full scale redistributions between classes are very costly: the state
must compensate landowners since, by de…nition, landless bene…ciaries can-
not. Due to the lack of credit and other complementary inputs, the poorest
bene…ciaries, who are the main targets of full scale reforms, are often forced
to sell back. While this concern is still relevant when redistributing within
the class of landowners, it is likely to be less serious. Compared to landless
peasants, landowners have better access to credit which reduces the need for
government subsidies and the incidence of distress sales. Thus, the e¤ect of
moderate reforms is more likely to be long lasting. Indeed, existing evidence
indicates that while being unsuccessful at redistributing to landless peasants,
redistribution policies have often managed to transfer land to the rural middle
class (Binswanger et al 1995, Deininger and Feder 1998).
Furthermore, a full comparison between the two policies should take into
account equity considerations and general equilibrium e¤ects. Here we note
that, compared to a redistribution between rural classes, redistribution among
large landowners does worse in terms of equity and does not give the poor a
collaterizable asset that can be used for other forms of investment.
Finally, anequally important question is thatconcerning implementation–
namely how to transfer land among landowners, and which land and landown-
ers need to be targeted. Scholars of economic development have devoted great
attention to this question focusing, however, on land redistribution to small
owner cultivators (see Banerjee 1999). While providing a detailed account of
all possible implementation strategies goes beyond the scope of this paper,
here we note that the imposition and enforcement of land ceilings has a much
smaller information requirement and leaves more room to market forces com-
pared to outright con…scation and redistribution. The latter indeed entails the
government to choose which land to con…scate and whom to give it to. With
land ceilings, in contrast, owners whose landholdings are larger than the max-
imum allowed and potential buyers are left free to bargain on which land gets
transferred at what price. Crucially, scholars point to the importance of not
14Landowners may be willing to agree to full scale redistribution, if they are generously
compensated. Compensation can rarely be paid by the bene…ciaries as these could not a¤ord
to buy the land in the …rst place. If farmers have to borrow to compensate previous owners,
the e¢ciency gains of full scale redistribution are greatly reduced. The debt diminishes e¤ort
incentives because of limited liability. Thus, compensation must be paid with government
revenues, raising the issue of …scal sustainability.
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and therefore be usedas loopholes to make the ceilings legislation ine¤ective.15
5 Conclusion
This paper analyzes land redistribution within the class of large landowners,
focusing on its e¤ects on agricultural employment and productivity. We have
shown that “moderate” land redistribution reduces agency costs and increases
workers’ productivity and welfare, even if the number of workers subject to
moral hazard is unchanged. This result follows from the fact that redistribut-
ing land among landowners can lead to higher competition in the market for
rural labor, which, in a world with moral hazard and limited liability, results
in higher pay and stronger incentives for rural laborers.
The analysis also indicates that moderate redistributions can do as well
as a full scale redistribution to the tiller in terms of e¢ciency. This result
is of interest because full scale redistributions are typically very costly, both
…nancially and politically.
While we have focused on the static gains, in a dynamic setting a one-o¤
reduction in inequality withinthe landowning class mightalsohave stronglong
runconsequences for growth. As showninMookherjee andRay (2002) poverty
traps can emerge due to limited liability because workers have no incentive to
save when landlords have all the bargaining power. A reform that reduces
the bargaining power of landlords might give workers incentives to accumulate
wealth and thus promote growth.
15For instance, land ceiling laws often exempt certain crops (e.g. tea, co¤ee and cocoa),
which then pushes large owners to plant these crops to retain the land, even if that is not
its most productive use. See Banerjee (1999) for a detailed discussion.
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The …rst order conditions are:






„ + · = 1 (FOCb)
There are two cases, depending on whether the limited liability constraint
binds.
(a) Limited Liability does not bind ! · = 0 ! „ = 1: Equilibrium e¤ort
is e¤ that solves p0(e)¡d0(e) = 0: Note that this is the …rst best level of e¤ort,
that is the e¤ort that maximizes total surplus. Payment in the bad state is
b = ¹ v+d(e¤)¡p(e¤): This case applies for all w such that b > ¡w; that is for
w ¸ ¹ w(¹ v) = p(e¤) ¡ d(e¤) ¡ ¹ v:
(b) Limited Liability binds ! · > 0 ! „ < 1: Equilibrium e¤ort is ^ e







= 0: Note that ^ e is less than














(p0)2 > 0 for any e: Using the fact that p00 < 0 and d00 > 0
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e¤ to satisfy the …rst order condition. Payment in the bad state is b = ¡w:
This case applies for w < ¹ w(¹ v):
Proof of Lemma 1: (i) Consider w < ¹ w(¹ v); that is, the limited liability
constraint binds. At the equilibrium level of e¤ort ^ e; p(^ e)
d0(^ e)
p0(^ e)+b¡d(^ e)¡¹ v = 0:
Taking the total di¤erential yields: d^ e





> 0. (ii) This is obvious since
¹ w(¹ v) = p(e¤) ¡ d(e¤)¡ ¹ v.¥
2: The labor market equilibrium and proof of Lemma 2
Notethatbyusingbackwardinduction, landownersperceive e¤ortinduced
in equilibrium as e(¹ v;w): Their pro…t per plot can be expressed as the surplus
produced on each plot, S(e(¹ v;w), minus the compensation given to workers,
¹ v. In the …rst stage, ¹ v is determined as a function of labor demand. Thus,
landowner i chooses Li given Lj; in order to maximize:
max
Li
Li…(w;v(L)) = Li(S(e(v(L);w) ¡ v(L))
where L = Li + Lj; subject to the capacity constraint:
Li · Ni:
The …rst order condition is:
[S(e(v(L);w)¡ v(L)] ¡ LivL + LiSeevvL ¡ ‚i = 0
where ‚i is the Lagrange multiplier for the capacity constraint.16
Proof of Lemma 2: we …rst show that there cannot be an equilibrium in
which the capacity constraint binds for the ‘large’ landlord but not for the
small landlord.
Indeed, if the ‘large’ landlord’s constraint binds, it must be that L2 =
N2 ¸ N1: If the capacity constraint for the small landlord does not bind, it
must be that L1 < N1: That is, it has to be that L1 < L2: However, since









16When no confusion is created, we drop the exogenous variable w from the func-
tion e(¹ v;w).
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constraints bind, (b) the constraint binds for the ‘small’ landlord only, and (c)
the constraint binds for both.
Proof of Part (i): Case (a) If neither constraint binds then ‚1 = ‚2 = 0:





The right-hand-side of (1) depends only on L: Hence, the equilibrium solution
is symmetric, in which L1 = L2: This implies that Li = L
2: Denote the solution






by ¹ L: This equilibrium holds if
¹ L
2 · Ni for all i:
Case (b) If the constraint binds for the ‘small’ landlord only, then ‚2 = 0
and ‚1 > 0: Then, L1 = N1 and
L2 =
S(e(v(N1+ L2)) ¡ v(N1 + L2)
vL ¡ SeevvL
Denote the solution to this equation by ¹ L2(N1): We …nd ‚1 by:
N1 =
S(e(v(N1 + L2))¡ v(N1 +L2) ¡ ‚1
vL ¡ SeevvL
This equilibrium holds if 2N1 < ¹ L and if ¹ L2(N1) · N2: Note that N1 < ¹ L2(N1)
since the FOC has to be satis…ed for the small owner as well. In both cases,
the FOC’s right-hand-side is the same but for the small owner there is also a
¡‚1 term. Moreover, if indeed N1 < ¹ L2(N1) then it must be that ‚1 > 0 by
the FOCs and the non-symmetric solution.
Finally, we show that labor demands are strategic substitutes. The FOC
for the large owner has ‚2 = 0: We take a total di¤erentiation of the FOC:
[A]dL1 +[SeevvL ¡ vL +A]dL2 = 0
for











¡(SeevvL ¡ vL) ¡ A
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We know that See = p00 ¡ d00 < 0 and note also that e(¹ v;w) is concave in each
element that is evv < 0.17 Also vLL > 0 by the assumption that this is the
inverse labor supply function. Hence, A < 0; implying that
dL2
dL1 < 0:
Proof of Part (ii): When both constraints bind L1 = N1 and L2 = N2 and
hence v(L) = v(N1 + N2): From the FOCs, indeed the Lagrange multipliers
are positive. This equilibrium holds when 2N1 < ¹ L and ¹ L2(N1) > N2; that is
when N is small or N < N1 + ¹ L2(N1):¥
3: Proof of Lemma 3
Let total employment be de…nedas L(N1): Consider then the equilibrium
in which the distribution is su¢ciently unequal so that the capacity constraint








¡(SeevvL ¡ vL)¡ A
=
¡(SeevvL ¡ vL)
¡(SeevvL ¡ vL)¡ A
> 0:
When the distribution is equal enough so that neither capacity constraint
bind, and as longas redistribution does not alter the ranking(that is, thesmall
owner always owns at most the same number of plots as the large owner) we
get the same symmetric solution and hence
@L(N1)
@N1 = 0: ¥
4: Proof of Proposition 1
Total surplus is equal to:
TS(N1) = L(N1) ¢ S(N1) = L(N1)S(e(v(L(N1)))
17 To see this, denote f(e) =p(e)
d0(e)
p0(e) ¡d(e): Then under mild restrictions on p000








p02(d000p0 ¡d0p000) ¡2p0p00(d00p0 ¡p00d0)
p04 >0
since e = f¡1(w +¹ v); this implies that evv < 0:
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(S + SeevvLL) > 0:
From Lemma 3 we know that @L
@N1 > 0 when the initial distribution is
unequal (that is the capacity constraint binds for the small owner) and from
Lemma 1 we know that ev > 0 when the limited liability constraint binds.
Hence when workers are poor and the initial distribution is unequal, redis-
tribution increases both employment and e¤ort. When workers are relatively
rich and the initial distribution is unequal, redistribution increases employ-
ment and maintains the same e¤ort level. When the initial distribution is
su¢ciently equal (namely when neither capacity constraint binds), Lemma 3
shows that @L
@N1 = 0 and hence total surplus is unchanged.¥
5: Proof of Corollary 1
Since an equalizing redistribution from N1 to ~ N1 induces the …rst best
level of e¤ort and e¤ort is increasing in N1, there must be ^ N1 · ~ N1 such that
for all N1 ¸ ^ N1 e¤ort is at …rst best.¥
6: Proof of Proposition 2
(i) When N1 increases all the inframarginal workers earn more net of
disutility costs and hence their welfare increases.
(ii) Recall that the …rst order condition for the large landlord is:
S(e(v(L(N1))) ¡ v(L(N1))+ L2(SeevvL ¡ vL) = 0














but S ¡ v > 0 for any level of employment, N1
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@L2(N1)




that is, the welfare of the small landlord increases.
(iii) The joint welfare of landlords L(S(e(v(L))¡ v(L)) is obviously max-
imized when one of them is a monopolist, i.e. when N1 = 0. It then follows
that, by curtailing monopoly power, redistribution causes the joint welfare to
fall. Since the joint welfare of the landlords decreases and the welfare of the
small landlord increases, the welfare of the large landlord must decrease.¥
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